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Losses are a possibility in many risky decisions, and organisms have
evolvedmechanisms toevaluateandavoid them. Laboratoryandﬁeld
evidence suggests thatpeopleoftenavoid riskswith lossesevenwhen
they might earn a substantially larger gain, a behavioral preference
termed “loss aversion.” The cautionary brake on behavior known to
rely on the amygdala is a plausible candidatemechanism for loss aver-
sion, yet evidence for this idea has so far not been found. We studied
tworare individualswithfocalbilateralamygdala lesionsusingaseries
of experimental economics tasks. To measure individual sensitivity to
ﬁnancial losses we asked participants to play a variety of monetary
gambles with possible gains and losses. Although both participants
retained a normal ability to respond to changes in the gambles’
expected value and risk, they showed a dramatic reduction in loss
aversion compared to matched controls. The ﬁndings suggest that
the amygdala plays a key role in generating loss aversionby inhibiting
actions with potentially deleterious outcomes.
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Loss aversion describes the widespread behavioral avoidance ofchoices that can lead to losses, even when accompanied by equal
or much larger gains. This phenomenon was ﬁrst proposed as part of
“prospect theory” (1), a theory of choice among monetary gambles.
Across many studies, losses typically loom about 1.5–2 times as large
as gains: for instance, people will avoid gambles in which they are
equally likely to either lose $10 or win $15, even though the expected
value of the gamble is positive ($2.50). Loss aversion has been well
documented in the laboratory and inmanyﬁeld settings (2), including
high-stakes game show decisions (3), ﬁnancial markets (4), politics
(5), tradepolicy fordeclining industries (6), rateoforgandonation for
transplant cases (7)andhasalsobeenevident inmonkeybehavior (8).
But what drives loss-averse behavior, and what neural structures
mediate the effect?
Our study tested the hypothesis that the amygdala mediates loss
aversion, an ideamotivatedbya large literature implicating this brain
structure in processing fear and threat (9), as well as in anticipation
and experience of monetary loss (10). Given the amygdala’s prom-
inent role in affective processing, it is also relevant to note that loss
aversion appears to increase with affective enrichment of “hedonic”
consumer goods (e.g., music CDs versus computer disks) (11) and
more generally with emotional attachment (12). Intriguingly, recent
theories of amygdala function argue that the amygdala subserves an
abstract function in detecting uncertainty (13) or ambiguity (14) in
the environment and in triggering arousal and vigilance as a con-
sequence.Thishypothesis is consistentwitha tendency foramygdala-
lesioned monkeys to approach stimuli that healthy monkeys avoid
(15), as well as greater amygdala activation in people with more
inhibited personalities (16). Furthermore, a recent study found that
increased cognitive control of the autonomic emotional responses
normally elicited by losses signiﬁcantly reduced the susceptibility to
loss aversion (17). However, a recent fMRI study (18) did not ﬁnd
amygdala activation associated with loss aversion and is discussed in
more detail below.
Our goal in the present study was to provide a direct test of the
hypothesis that the amygdala is part of a computational process
that leads to loss aversion. To do this, we test the revealed aversion
to ﬁnancial losses of individuals with amygdala damage.
Results
The twoparticipants have rare focal bilateral lesions of the amygdala
(Fig. 1).Their neuroanatomyandbackgroundneuropsychologyhave
been described in detail elsewhere (9, 19, 20). Both individuals
have impairments in processing fear despite otherwise largely nor-
mal cognition and IQ. The ﬁrst participant, S.M., is a 43-year-old
woman with a high school education whose lesions encompass the
entire amygdala plus subjacent white matter and anterior entorhinal
cortex. The second participant, A.P., is a 23-year-old woman with a
college education whose lesions are entirely conﬁned to the amyg-
dala and encompass roughly 50% of the amygdala. The two partic-
ipants were each compared to a separate group of 6 healthy controls
(12 in total) matched to that participant on age, gender, monetary
income, and education.
At the beginning of the experiment, participants received an
endowment of $50 in cash. During the behavioral task participants
were asked to accept or reject a series of mixed gambles with equal
(50%) probability of winning or losing a variable amount of
money. These were presented on a computer screen as the pro-
spective outcomes of a coin ﬂip. Participants indicated their will-
ingness to take the gamble by a key press. A total of 256 trials were
presented (split in four 64-trial sessions). The risky gamble in each
trial had 1 of 16 potential gains ranging from+$20 to +$50, and 1
of 16 potential losses ranging from −$20 to −$50, both sampled in
increments of $2 (Fig. 2). Each of the 256 (16 × 16) possible gain–
loss pairs were present in only one gamble.
The behavioral results can be visualized in a 5 × 5 matrix that
combines gambles with similar gain and loss amounts (seeMethods
for more details). The percentage of gamble choices in each cell is
represented by color, in Fig. 3. Both amygdala-lesioned partic-
ipants showed a strikingly higher willingness to accept gambles
than their matched control groups. This shift in accepting gambles
wasmost prominent in S.M.Critically, both participants retained a
monotonic sensitivity to reward magnitude (i.e., they preferred
larger gains and smaller losses).
We next quantiﬁed differential behavioral sensitivity to gains G
and lossesL and estimated the aversion to choosing these gambles,
and the magnitude of loss aversion, for each individual participant.
The expected value of each gamble (i.e., EV = 0.5G + 0.5L) was
entered into a logistic regression analysis as an independent vari-
able, whereas participants’ choices were the dependent variable.
The response function estimates the expected value at which par-
ticipants are indifferent between accepting the gamble and turning
it down (i.e., the EV with an acceptance rate of 50%, known as the
“risk premium”). Conﬁdence intervals for each lesion participant
wereobtained fromabootstrap analysis of their data that generated
500 pseudosubjects constructed by randomly sampling 256 choices
with replacement from the original data set for that participant. For
each of these pseudosubjects a logistic regressionwas ﬁt to estimate
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an indifference point. To generate normal distributions of the two
control groups a similar bootstrap procedurewas also performed by
randomly sampling with replacement the equivalent of an entire
participant’s choice set (i.e., 256 choices) from the pooled data of
the six control participants within a group (seeMethods for details).
This procedure showed that each amygdala-lesioned participant
had a signiﬁcantly lower risk premium than her matched control
group, S.M. t(5) = 7.76 P < 0.001; A.P. t(5) = 13.57; P < 0.001
(independent two-sample 2-tailed t tests; Fig. 4).
To quantify loss aversion for each participant, we calculated the
parameter λ such that gambles with adjusted expected utilities of
0.5G + 0.5λ × L are estimated (from a logistic regression) to be
chosen half the time. This parameter gives an indication of how
heavily participants appear to weight losses compared to gains,
inferred from the choices they made. This analysis yielded λ = 0.76
for S.M., and a mean λ for the S.M. control group of 1.52 (SEM =
0.19). For A.P., λ = 1.06 whereas the mean λ for the A.P. control
group was 1.76 (SEM= 0.12). For more details see Table S1.
The values of λ estimated by our analysis show that neither
amygdala-lesioned participant exhibits loss aversion whereas the
control participant λ estimates are close to those found in previous
studies (17, 18). In particular, whereas A.P. is essentially loss neu-
tral, S.M. showsa slightly loss-seekingbehavior.Aproportional shift
toward a less loss-averse behavior is evident also in the S.M.
matched control groupwhen compared to theA.P.matched control
group (Fig. 3 B–D).
Note that loss aversion is a special distaste for mixed gambles
with possible losses, as if losses areoverweighted compared to gains
when valuing gambles. Risk aversion, by contrast, is amore general
aversion to increased variation in outcomes (regardless of whether
they are gains or losses). The risk premium differences shown in
Fig. 4 could be due to either aversion to loss or to general aversion
to taking risk.
These explanations can be separated using two further anal-
yses. The ﬁrst analysis exploited the fact that in our experimental
design the outcome variance (VAR) of each mixed gain–loss
gamble is orthogonal to the gamble’s EV (i.e., they are uncor-
related) (Fig. 5). This feature of the design allowed us to conﬁrm
that the lesion participants’ willingness to gamble is speciﬁc to
loss processing and not to a general reduction in risk sensitivity.
Critically, both lesion participants exhibited a marked dislike for
increasing outcome variance, given a constant level of expected
value. This was manifested in a reduction in gamble acceptance
rates as a function of increases in the gamble’s variance (Fig. 6).
Most importantly, their dislike for increased variance was no
different from that of the controls.
The second analysis uses a different series of risky gambles that
do not have any possible losses. Participants were asked to choose
between accepting a sure amount S or ﬂipping a coin for a “double
or nothing” outcome, in which outcomes 0 and 2S are equally
likely, for different values of S. In this task, there was no signiﬁcant
difference in the acceptance rate of each lesion participant and
that participant’smatched controls S.M. t(5)= 1.16, P> 0.1; A.P. t
(5) = 0.65, P > 0.1 [independent two-sample 2-tailed t tests (21)].
Both lesion participants thus showed a degree of risk aversion over
gains comparable to the risk aversion of their respective control
group (Fig. S1).
Discussion
The goal of the current study was to test the hypothesis that the
amygdala plays a necessary role in generating loss aversion during
human decision making. Our ﬁndings conﬁrmed this idea and pro-
vided additional speciﬁcity. Both amygdala-lesioned participants
showed a dramatic absence of loss aversion yet they retained a nor-
mal response to reward magnitude. This pattern of behavior is
consistent with evidence that monkeys with amygdala lesions main-
tain a stable pattern of preference among sets of food items (22),
Fig. 1. Selectivebilateral calciﬁcationof theamygdala (arrows)due toUrbach-
Wiethe disease is evident as loss of signal on these T1-weighted structural MRI
scans of the brains of S.M. and A.P.
Fig. 2. Experimental task design. Participants saw a two-outcome gamble that offered equal (50%) chances of gaining or losing different amounts. We
sampled the entire matrix shown on the Right. Each cell represents the expected value (i.e., EV = 0.5G + 0.5L) associated with each gamble. This task is a
modiﬁcation of the one used in an fMRI study (18), with the critical difference that our gain/loss range was symmetrical and larger. At the end of the
experiment one trial was randomly selected and paid out according to the participant’s decision during the experiment.
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even though theywill approach foods that are pairedwith potentially
threatening stimuli more quickly than control monkeys (15).
Critically, the further analysis of the response to variance inmixed
gain–loss gambles, and choices of gain-only gambles, show that the
lesion participants do not have an increased appetite for risk per se,
because they dislike increased outcome variance and risk asmuch as
the matched controls did. Instead, they differ only in their higher
willingness to acceptmixed gain–loss gambles,which is evidenceof a
speciﬁc reduction in aversion to loss. This ﬁnding also tentatively
suggests that loss aversion and general distaste for risk may depend
on partly separable neural systems.
It is notable that whereas participant A.P. was essentially loss
neutral, participant S.M. showed a mild loss-seeking behavior. This
difference between the two lesion participants was mirrored by dif-
ferences in their respective matched control groups. Differences in
several sociodemographic factors may account for this variation
between the two participants and their respective control pop-
ulations. For example, the susceptibility to losses has been shown to
change with income (23), education (24), and aging (25) [the latter
behavioral effect could even be due to possible age-related reduc-
tions in amygdala volume (26)]. Furthermore, the fact that S.M. has
more extensive amygdala damage thanA.P.may also in part account
for the difference between the two lesion participants.
Our account of the ﬁndings proposes that the amygdala computes
a signal of prospective loss that is integrated with other information
to guide behavioral choice.More speciﬁcally, lesions to theamygdala
would result in a reduced input to downstream regions that compute
value through integrating across multiple inputs. In the case of
evaluation of mixed gambles, this could result in a reduced aversive
signal elicited by the prospect of potential loss together with normal
appetitive signals triggered by the prospect of potential gain. As a
consequence (in particular when the EV of the gamble is close to
zero), the appetitive response to the gain component of the gamble
may outweigh the aversive component in the lesion patients. This
scenario would explain themild loss-seeking behavior (i.e.,λ < 1) of
S.M. as well as the high acceptance rate of gambles with small
magnitude but negative EV observed in A.P. (Bottom Left corner of
B in Fig. 3), a type of behavior not seen in the controls.
Although a number of studies have investigated the neural pro-
cessing of monetary losses (10, 27), a single fMRI study (18) was
speciﬁcally designed to investigate the neural underpinnings of loss
aversion. That study used a protocol very similar to ours to identify a
BOLD signal in the ventral striatum that correlated positively with
the size of the potential gain and correlated negativelywith the size of
the potential loss. Critically, the slope of this signal for loss appeared
higher than for gain and the signal differences showed a psycho-
metric–neurometric match across participants with loss aversion λ
inferred from the participants’ behavioral choice. However, that
study did not ﬁnd any evidence for the amygdala’s involvement in
loss aversion.
One possible explanation for the negative ﬁnding of that prior
study is that the reduced range of potential losses used was insufﬁ-
ciently large to evokedetectableBOLDsignal in theamygdala,which
might have been obscured by the overall positive expected value of
the gambles (18). In contrast, the range of gains and losses we used is
symmetric, and twiceas largeas theoneused in theprior study (18).A
further reason why activity in the amygdala might not have been
detected by fMRI in the prior study is that the amygdala’s con-
tribution to loss aversionmight bedetectable usingBOLDfMRIonly
through its inputs to other brain structures [given that BOLD signal
reﬂectsprimarily synapticprocessing rather than spikingoutput (28)].
In this view, the amygdala produces an output signal in response to
prospective loss, which is conveyed to other value-sensitive brain
structures such as the ventral striatum and orbitofrontal cortex. A
plausible explanation that reconciles our ﬁndings with the previous
fMRI study is that an initial negative anticipatory response is gen-
erated in the amygdala, inﬂuences the striatal computation of the
gamble’snet value, andconsequently leads tobehavioral lossaversion
through striatal mediation of instrumental behavior. Amygdala and
striatum have a well-documented anatomic connectivity (29) and
show a tight functional coupling in stimulus–reward association
and stimulus–cuedevaluation (30). In this regard, theamygdala’s role
inmediating loss aversionmay be analogous to its role inmodulating
caudate- or hippocampal-dependent memory (31), and choice in
reversal tasks (20). In those examples, the amygdala is not the locusof
memory or of choice, but it passes a signal to other brain regions
for integration of such processes. Such an interpretation also ﬁts with
Fig. 3. Amygdala lesions block loss aversion. A 5× 5matrix collapses the data
from the complete matrix shown in Fig. 2. Color-coded heatmaps depict the
probability of gamble acceptance at each level of gain/loss (white indicates
high willingness to accept the gamble, and black indicates low willingness to
accept the gamble) within that cell. S.M. and A.P. were noticeably less loss
averse than their respective control groups.
Fig. 4. Quantiﬁcation of loss aversion. Bootstrap resampling analyses were
used to generate distributions of gamble expected values that imply indif-
ference in choice (the “risk premium”) for the amygdala lesion participants
and their controls. The ﬁrst two panels on the Left represent the logistic ﬁt
of the participants’ choices and the gambles’ EV. (Left panels) The lesion
participants are depicted in red and their respective resamples are depicted
in gray. (Central panels) Matched control group means are in black and
resamples are in gray. The histograms in the Right panels represent the risk
premium for the lesion participant group (red) and the control group (black)
generated by the bootstrap procedure (see Methods for more details). The
two lesion and control distributions are completely separated and their
means are signiﬁcantly different for both participants.
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a study showing that patients with lesions to a variety of emotion-
processing regions (including amygdala and prefrontal cortex) are
much more likely to take a single gamble with possible losses (32).
This idea could be tested further with future functional connectivity
studies as well as with fMRI in lesion participants.
Our ﬁndings could also shed some light on the nature of indi-
vidual differences in loss aversion observed in many behavioral
studies. There are well-known individual differences in amygdala
function, some linked to speciﬁc genetic polymorphisms (33). The
amygdala has also been shown to encode a reference-dependent
value signal,when the samenet outcomesare framedaseither losses
or gains froma shifted reference point (34).A recent genetics-fMRI
study extending this ﬁnding (35) has shown that a common poly-
morphism in the serotonin transporter changes amygdala reactivity
andmodulates how reference point changes affect perceived losses.
That ﬁnding, and our present results from lesion patients, suggest
that individual variance in amygdala function might contribute,
together with other socioeconomic factors, to individual differences
in loss aversion, even in healthy individuals.
Our ﬁndings demonstrate that the amygdala plays a necessary
role in generating loss aversion and suggest that loss aversion may
reﬂect a simple Pavlovian approach–avoidance responsemediated
by the amygdala (36, 37). Given the amygdala’s well-known link to
caution, vigilance (13), and fear in the face of uncertainty (15), we
suggest that the amygdalamay implement a very general biological
mechanism for inhibiting instrumental behavior when outcomes
are potentially aversive—a role that is expressed in monetary loss
aversion shaping everyday ﬁnancial decisions.
Methods
Participants. Two women with symmetrical and bilateral damage to the
amygdala took part in the study. Focal lesions in both lesion participants were
caused by Urbach-Wiethe disease (38), an extremely rare genetic disease that
results in medial temporal lobe damage. The ﬁrst participant, S.M., is a 43-
year-old woman with a high-school education and normal IQ, whose lesions
encompass the entire amygdala plus subjacent white matter and anterior
entorhinal cortex. The second participant, A.P., is a 23-year-old woman with
a college education and normal IQ. Her lesions are entirely conﬁned to the
amygdala, and occupy roughly 50% of each amygdala’s volume (see Fig. 1
for neuroanatomy). Both participants live independently, and in detailed
neuropsychological and clinical assessments show no evidence of psychiatric
illness. Neuroanatomy and background neuropsychology have been descri-
bed in detail (9, 19, 20). Each of these two participants was compared to her
own group of six neurologically and psychiatrically healthy controls, who
were matched in age [A.P. controls: mean age 23.6 ± 0.7 years (SD); S.M.
controls: mean age 52.8 ± 6.5 years (SD)], gender, income, and education.
Note that the sample size of lesion participants (n = 2) is common in neuro-
psychological studies—indeed, many famous studies used only a single partic-
ipant. The reason is that individuals with focal brain lesions such as the bilateral
amygdala lesions here are very rare. However, in spite of this limitation, lesion
studies are oneof the fewmethods in humanneuroscience to investigate causal
relationships between brain function and behavior.
All participants gave informed consent to participate according to a
protocol approved by the California Institute of Technology Institutional
Review Board.
Tasks. Loss aversion task. Before starting the experiment, participants received
an initial endowment of $50 in cash and were told that at the end of the
experiment one trial would be randomly selected and a payment made
according to their actual decision during the experiment; this is a standard
procedure used in behavioral economics, which ensures that participants
evaluate each gamble independently. Participants were told that their $50
endowment was given to them so that they could pay any eventual losses at
the end of the experiment. Any net amount from the endowment that
remained after subtracting a loss was theirs to keep, and similarly any
eventual gain earned in the experiment was added on top of the initial
endowment. Participants were paid these sums in cash immediately at the
end of the experiment.
The experiment consisted of a total of 256 trials (split into four sessions).
During the task, participants were asked to accept or reject a series of mixed
gambles with equal (50%) probability of winning or losing a variable amount
of money. These gambles were presented on a computer screen as the pro-
spective outcomes of a coinﬂip, and participants indicated their willingness to
take thegamblebykeypress. Eachgamblewasonthe screen for 4 seconds, and
participantswere requiredto input their responsewithin this time.Participants
werealso informed that if nokeywaspressedwithin this time theywouldpaya
penalty of $1. None of the participants missed a key press. Each trial was
uniquely and randomly sampled from a gains/losses matrix with potential
gains raging from +$20 to +$50 and potential losses from −$20 to −$50 in
increments of $2 (Fig. 2).
ThistaskisamodiﬁcationoftheoneusedinanfMRIstudy(18),withthecritical
difference that the gains/losses matrix we used was symmetric (the range of
gains and losses is the same).
Double or nothing task. At the end of the experiment, participants were tested
on their general risk attitude (independent from loss aversion) using a series
of monetary gambles that included only gains. In each trial, each participant
was presented with the choice either to accept a safe option (i.e., a variable
sure monetary amount) or to play a risky gamble (i.e., ﬂip a coin to either
double this sure amount or get nothing). The sure amount was either $2, or a
multiple of $5 from $5 to $50 for a total of 11 trials. Each trial was presented
eight times (88 trials in total) to the participants in random order. At the end
of the experiment a trial was randomly selected and a payment was made
according to the participant’s decision and a random outcome.
Data Analysis. The behavioral data were analyzed using MATLAB v. R2008a
(http://www.mathworks.com). The 5 × 5 color-coded heatmaps of probability
of gamble acceptance for each level of gain/loss (Fig. 3) were generated by
averaging the probability of acceptance for groups of 16 contiguous mixed
gambles. The color bar represents the probability of gamble acceptance (P) for
each level of gain/loss (i.e., P = 1 in white and P = 0 in black).
Fig. 6. Susceptibility to increase in variance (VAR). Each graph represents
the linear regression of the probability (P) of gamble acceptance for dif-
ferent levels of VAR. The lesion participants are represented by red lines and
their respective controls are represented by black lines (note that due to the
linear ﬁt the value of P may sometimes exceed the range 0–1). The negative
slopes of these linear ﬁts for both lesion participants (and the majority of the
control participants) reﬂect a distaste for increased variance of the gambles’
outcomes (i.e., reduction in probability of gamble acceptance as a function
of VAR increase).
Fig. 5. Loss aversion task: EV and VAR distribution. The heatmaps sum-
marize how the EV (i.e., EV = 0.5G + 0.5L) and the VAR (i.e., VAR = (0.5G −
0.5L)2, where G and L are gain and loss magnitudes. Note that VAR and EV
are orthogonal. The color heatmaps represent, respectively, the level of
expected value (EV; Left bar) and the level of variance (VAR; Right bar) for
each gamble as indicated by the two color bars on the Right of each matrix.
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To calculate the individual behavioral sensitivity to gainsG and losses L, the
expected value of each gamble (i.e., EV = 0.5G + 0.5L) was entered into a
logistic regression as an independent variable, whereas participants’ choices
were the dependent variable. The response function estimates the expected
value atwhich participants are indifferent betweenaccepting the gamble and
turning it down (i.e., the EV with an acceptance rate of 50%). Because the
earnings from not gambling are zero, the computed EV, which corresponded
to indifference, is known as the “risk premium.” The conﬁdence interval for
each of the amygdala-lesioned participants around this EV was estimated
through a bootstrap procedure. Five hundred resamples (i.e., pseudosubjects)
of the original data set were constructed by randomly sampling trials with
replacements from the original choice set. Each pseudosubject was of equal
size to an actual data set fromaparticipant (i.e., 256 choices). For eachof these
resampled pseudosubjects a logistic regressionwas performed to estimate the
risk premium (i.e., indifference point) following the procedure described
above. This procedure gives 500 estimates of the risk premium; the variance
across those estimates provides a way to use the participants’ own data to
measure how reliably the risk premium from the full sample is being esti-
mated. To calculate the mean risk premium for each control group, a logistic
regression was ﬁt to the pooled data set of all six control participants (i.e.,
256 × 6 = 1,536 choices). To generate a normal distribution for each control
group we performed a bootstrap of the original pooled data set by randomly
samplingwith replacement an entire participant’s choice set (i.e., 256 choices).
This procedure (i.e., bootstrappingat individuals level)was chosenbecause it is
amore conservative procedure than the bootstrap at trial level, as it preserves
the intersubject variability present in the control group. Thereafter, to esti-
mate the risk premium for each of the 500 pseudogroups generated by the
bootstrap, we performed a logistic regression as described above. The two
distributions (resampled lesion participant, resampled control group) were
compared using independent two-sample 2-tailed t tests with 5 degrees of
freedom. Thedegrees of freedomwere calculated on the original data sample
as df = N(Controls) − 1 (21).
To calculate the behavioral sensitivity to the gamble variance (VAR), we
calculated theVARof each gamble as follows: 0.5[G− (0.5G+0.5L)]2 + 0.5× 0.5
[L− (0.5G + 0.5L)]2 = (0.5G− 0.5L)2 (where L is a negative number denoting the
potential loss). We then estimated the probability of gamble acceptance (P)
for groups of gambles sharing the same variance and we calculated (using
linear regression) howP is affectedby the increase inVAR.Note that, given the
symmetrical nature of our task (Fig S1), the gambles’ EV and VAR are fully
orthogonal and groups of gambleswith the same level of VARwill on average
have the same EV (i.e., mean EV = 0).
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